How to distinguish the semantic and metaphysical components of scientific realism? Is there a distinction at all?
Here are some short reflections that are only indirectly related to the main theme of this blog: about the traditional way of framing the thesis of scientific realism, that always confused me a bit. The components of scientific realism It is custom to distinguish the components of scientific realism very roughly as follows: Metaphysical thesis: there is a mind-independent structure of natural kinds Semantic thesis: scientific theories are "about" this mind-independent structure Epistemic thesis: we are in a position to know that they are true Although this three-fold distinction seems to make sense, it isn't so easy to classify various philosophical positions in this scheme, notably when it comes to pragmatist views, Kantian views or varieties of constructivism. Should they be interpreted metaphysically or semantically? Are they thesis about representation or about the nature of reality? I have always struggled a bit to respond (usually interpreting kant...