The Pragmatic Conception of Scientific Theories

Here are our conclusions so far: what the semantic conception of theories claims is that a theory provides us with a certain family of representational vehicles that are non-linguistic in nature, its models; however, the idea that representation in science is non-linguistic is unwarranted: for sure, the informal features of experimentation and the contextual nature of idealisations are hard to address using the correspondence rules put forth by logical empiricists, but this seems to point to a more pragmatic conception of linguistic interpretation, not to the idea that representation would be structural instead of linguistic. Having said that, I think that there is still a grain of truth in the semantic view, which is the following: Theories do not represent or describe nature directly as a whole. They are used to build models that represent it piecemeal. This, I take it, is an assumption that is shared by semantic and pragmatist conceptions of theories, and that is rather at odds...

We have now settled, in conclusion of the previous article, on the most sensible interpretation of the semantic view: not a difference of grain in theory identification, not the idea that there are different levels of abstraction with models lying in between abstract theories and experience, but simply the idea that scientific representation isn’t linguistic at all. My understanding of this is the following: for the semantic view, a theory provides us not with literal descriptions of nature, but with a certain way of representing the world, or a certain kind or family of representational vehicles, its models, which are non-linguistic in nature, and which play a central role in science, a role that was neglected by syntacticists. Of course, the theory itself (as well as its models) are expressed by means of linguistic/mathematical formula, but these formula shouldn’t be taken to describe nature directly. There’s an intermediate level, constituted by the models. And the way models repr...

In the previous article, I explained that there seem to be no superficial difference between the syntactic and the semantic views when it comes to presenting theories. Both can individuate theories using the same level of grain, and they will use the same statements to do so. But an important difference remains of course: the syntactic view characterises the theory with the statements that are presented, while the semantic view characterises it with what these statements supposedly describe, namely a family of models satisfying these statements. What shall we make of this? And don't wave your hands and tell me that it's a difference of "stance" of "focus" or whatever: I want something concrete . Tell me exactly why I should subscribe to one or the other conception of theories. Let's first discard an understanding of it. Obviously, theories and models represent nature. When semanticists say that statements describe the theory, they aren't claiming ...

Having reviewed the work of the most influential authors on the syntactic and semantic views of theories (and having read a bunch of articles that I won’t review here), I guess it’s about time to give my own reflections on this debate. So, what is it all about? Are theories statements about the world, or are they families of models? Or something else entirely? As my draft was becoming very long, I decided to cut these reflections into several parts. Today, I will argue that there are no differences of grain in the way the two views can individuate theories, so that the difference must lie somewhere else: in the way theories are interpreted. Tomorrow, I will examine and debunk an idea: that the semantic view is about there being various more or less abstract levels of representation in science, with models playing an intermediary role between statements and phenomena: this cannot be the claim. The day after I will examine a better idea: that it's all about representation in s...

In “There Are No Such Things As Theories”, Steven French defends that there are no such things as theories. This well-named book provides a careful review of a wide range of issues, ranging from the philosophy of science (the syntactic and semantic conceptions of scientific theories, fictionalism about scientific representation, theoretical equivalence, science in practice) to the philosophy of art, with a particular focus on the metaphysics of abstract objects, including fictions and works of art, and, of course, theories, so as to arrive at its provocative conclusion, which is roughly the following: scientific theories don’t really exist, but we can still make sense of ordinary discourse about scientific theories. I wasn’t convinced by this conclusion in the end, but I think that this is because I approach things very differently at the meta-philosophical level, and I am not particularly moved by metaphysical considerations in general (the ones signalled by the “really” emphasised...